

Lord The Air Smells Good

Felicitation volume in honour of
Fr. Paul Jackson S.J.



Edited by
Anand Amaladass
Victor Edwin

Lord The Air Smells Good

Felicitation volume in honour of
Fr. Paul Jackson S.J.

Edited by
Anand Amaladass
Victor Edwin



ATC Publishers
Bengaluru, India

Lord The Air Smells Good: Felicitation volume in honour of
Fr. Paul Jackson S. J.

Copyright © 2018 by Victor Edwin

First Edition 2018

No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means - for example, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying and recording without
the prior permission of the publisher.

Cover Design: S Jayaraj

Cover Page Painting: Ms. Asma Menon

All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-93-86516-41-1.

Published by ATC Publishers
Sadupadesa Vidyalaya, 28/1, Hennur Road
Kalyan Nagar Post, Bengaluru – 560 043, India
Tel: +91-80-65341884; Mob: +91-9036003544, 7090100444
E-mail: info@atcbooks.in Website: www.atcbooks.in

Printed at L.S. Graphic Prints,
13, Swamy Naicken Street, Chintadripet,
Chennai – 600002

Pages: xvi+298.

Content

Editors' Introduction

ix

1.
Totally Present to the Other.
The Dialogical Legacy of Paul Jackson.
Victor Edwin

1

Part I

Understanding Islam in Context

2.
Knowledge and Mercy in Mawdudi and Ibn 'Arabi
David Emmanuel Singh
3.
From Nizamuddin to the Nations: Transnational Trajectories at the
Origins of the Tablighi Jama'at
Matthew J. Kuiper
4.
Jesus And Mary In Tafsīr Muqātil Ibn Sulaymān
F. Zammini
5.
The Mystery of Yusef: Overcoming Mimetic Violence via the
Abrahamic Scriptural and Spiritual Tradition
Edward J. Alam
6.
Shah Jahan and *Taṣawwūf*.
Michael D. Calabria

15

46

77

94

104

Part II

Building Christian-Muslim Relationship

7.
Christian-Muslim Dialogue through Art Forms
Anand Amaladass 130
8.
The Growth of "Islamophobia" (Fear of Islam) in contemporary
German society as a challenge to the Christians living there.
Christian W. Troll 146
9.
Karl Barth's Critique of "Islam" as a Stimulus for Christian-
Muslim Dialogue.
Tobias Specker 162
10.
Dynamism Of Christian-Muslim Relation In A *Pancasila*-Based
Country.
JB. Heru Prakosa 189
11.
The Importance of a Paradigm Shift in Understanding Christianity
and Islam.
C.T. R. Hewer 210
12.
A Christian-Islam Conversation on Climate Change
Francis Gonsalves S.J. 224
13.
More Than Silaturahmi How We Indonesian Christians Learned
To Communicate With Our Muslim Brothers And Sisters.
Franz Magnis-Suseno 243

Part III

Studies on Sharafuddin Maneri

14.
Walking with Maneri: Christian and Sufi Wisdom in Dialogue
Leo D. Lefebure 259
15.
Attention to Human Experience Leads to a Deeper Life:
The Wisdom of *The Hundred Letters* of Sharafuddin Maneri.
Herman Roborgh 265
16.
Writings of Fr. Paul Jackson 288
- Notes on Contributors.** 294

**Dynamism Of Christian-Muslim Relation
In A *Pancasila*-Based Country**

JB. Heru Prakosa

Some Periods in the Indonesian History

As a nation born after more than 350 years under the Dutch colonialism, Indonesia has a long political history. Perhaps, we can divide it in some periods:

(1) the pre-colonial period, in which the area now known as Indonesia – or Nusantara – was a vast archipelago with a great diversity in terms of ethnicity, geography, religious belief and culture. By the third or fourth century, many people embraced Hinduism or Buddhism as their beliefs and religions. A few centuries later Islam and Christian began to spread among the area of Indonesia;

(2) the Dutch colonial period, started with a trading company (VOC–*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*), from 1602-1799, continued with the colonial government, from 1800-1942, and confronted with the rise of Indonesian nationalism in the form of independence movements since 1900-s;

(3) the Japanese occupation, from 1942-1945, in which the Japanese, by defeating the Dutch, launched against the Allied forces;

(4) the proclamation of independence – on August 17, 1945 – after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the surrender of the Empire of Japan to the Allied forces at the end of the Second World War;

(5) the period of struggling to keep the independence, from 1945-1949, due to the fact that the Dutch tried to re-colonize Indonesia;

(6) the period of 1950-1965 when Soekarno as the first president made his government people-oriented in nature and anti-foreign intervention. In 1955, Soekarno hosted the conference of the newly-independent nations of Asia and Africa in Bandung, West Java, and promoted cold war neutrality by promoting a coalition called the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM);

(7) the tragedy of the killing of the Indonesians accused of being communist. Almost half a million Indonesians were massacred in a blood bath;

(8) the period of 1966-1998, when the second president, Soeharto, a military general, set up his elitist and authoritarian as well as militaristic government;

(9) the post-Soeharto period, from 1998 till today, in which the Indonesians have tried to reform the country into a system of democracy on the basis of maximum participation of the citizens in struggling against the social and economic injustice including the corruption-free government.

Brief View on Islam and Christianity in Indonesia

According to the 2010 national census, the population of Indonesia reaches 237.6 million. Based on the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (2000), 88.22 percent of the population in Indonesia identify themselves as Muslims, 5.87 percent as Protestants, 3.05 percent as Catholics, 1.81 percent as Hindus, 0.84 percent as Buddhists, and 0.2 percent as 'others', including those who follow traditional-indigenous beliefs.

Regarding Islam, the understandings of its coming to Indonesia are limited. There are various arguments on it.¹ There is

¹ (a) Scholars like Pijnappel, Snouck Hurgronje, Moquette, Winstedt, Schrieke, Stutterheim, Vlekke, Kern, Winsted, Gonda, Fatimi and Morison argue that Muslims entered into Indonesia from Gujarat (Cambay) India through cosmopolitan traders in the late thirteenth

also considerable debate among scholars about the conclusions that can be drawn in relation to the conversion of Indonesian people to Islam.² Some say that the process of conversion to Islam in the

century. This is indicated from the fact that the trade relation between Indonesia and India grew long time ago. In addition, the philosophy of Sufism practiced in India at those times, under Mughal rule, had a similar impact on Indonesia. The discovery of the gravestone of the Sultan of SamudraPasai Malik Al-Saleh in 1297 shows that it has a Gujarat style. (b) Some other scholars, like Umar Amir Husen and P.A. Hussein Jayadiningrat, hold the opinion that Islam was brought by Muslims from Persia (Iran) circa thirteenth century; and on the way to Indonesia, they stopped over in India. This is due to the fact that the Shiite celebration to commemorate the death of Muhammad's grandchild, Husayn, on the tenth of Muharram known as the Asyura was practiced in West Sumatra as Tabuik/Tabut. In addition, there is a compatibility between the teaching of Shaykh Siti Jenar and the Sufi of Persia, al-Hallaj. In 1419, people discovered in Gresik the tomb of Mawlana Malik Ibrahim. As such, for some scholars, the name of Mawlana is related to Persia. (c) Some other scholars, like T.W. Arnold, Crawford, Van Leur, Crawford, Keijzer, Naimann, de Hollander, including Hasjmi, Al-Attas, HAMKA, Djajadiningrat, Mukti Ali and Hilmy Bakar argue that Islam came to Indonesia directly from Arab in the seventh century. Naimann and de Hollander said more specifically that Islam came to Indonesia from Hadramaut, South of Yemen. It is indicated, according to them, from the fact that, in the west coast of Sumatra, in the year 674, there was already a village where many Arabs had lived. Moreover, the SamudraPasai followed the *mazhab* of Syafi'i; and the big influence of the *mazhab* of Syafi'i came from Mecca and Egypt, not Persia. (d) Scholars like Muljana and Soemanto al-Qurtuby acknowledge that there were many agents who were involved in the spreading of Islam to Indonesia; and according to them, one cannot disregard the role of China Muslims. One should remember that there was a China expansion to Java in 1292. Some cities in Java were formerly the Chinese Bandars. In addition, they also say that some Muslim leaders at those times had Chinese blood. A book that speaks about the role of the Islamic China written by Prof. Muljana, however, was banned by the government with the decree No. Kep.043-DA/1971.

² Ricklefs, M.C., *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1300*, 2nd Edition, London, MacMillan, 1991, p.3.

Indonesian society took place due to marriage, between the Muslim traders and the local-Indonesian women. Some other scholars argue that it was also supported by the economic and political reasons, one of which was to defend from the power of the Majapahit kingdom. Islamization was, for the merchants, a means to counter the central ruling classes of the Majapahit kingdom, as well as a way to cooperate with the local chiefs in the exploitation of peasants. Thus, to a large extent, the Islamization of Indonesia was the result of a coalition between chiefs and traders who wanted to maximize their profits from the rural periphery without endangering their position. In sum, from those perspectives, the spread of Islam into Indonesia was caused by the fusion of political and economic interests.

Some other scholars also hold that the process of conversion to the religion of Islam took place because of the role of the Sufis. This is clear, for example, with the works of Fatahillah, in 1524, in spreading Islam to Pajajaran, west Java, and the works of *Wali Songo* (Nine Wali-s) in spreading Islam in central and east Java. The process of conversion to the religion of Islam took place due to the harmony atmosphere in the Javanese society. For Javanese people, in fact, the adoption of the new religion could occur without a conflict, due to the belief that the new religion could access energy resources and develop supernatural powers. As such, sectarian intolerance is an uncommon idea for the Javanese society.

As such, the Javanese Islam shows 'a nuance of un-orthodoxy', particularly in the teaching that is based on the mystical doctrine of 'non-duality'. What is meant here is the belief that 'the reality within creation is not different from the creator'. The term that is usually used to designate this belief is called 'pantheism' and/or 'monism';³ and in fact they have roots in the

Hindu-Buddhism tradition. In Hinduism, the idea of pantheism or monism is found for example in the characteristic tenets of the Vedas and the Upanisads, for Brahman as a reality of a higher order is believed to be one with world, that the Brahman as the 'world soul' is considered as living in everything; whereas in Buddhism, due to the belief that the goal of life is 'a state of the individual rather than a relation' – and thus 'oneness' – in a certain sense, it then corresponds to the idea of pantheism or monism.

Yes, Javanese Islam is not the only inculturated Islam that shows 'a nuance of un-orthodoxy'. It should be noted that Islam in Indonesia has many faces. In the West Lesser Sunda islands, in an island called Lombok, for example, we hear about *Islam Wetu Telu*. The word '*telu*' means three. Regarding '*wetu*', there are some different interpretations, one of which is 'time to pray'. One of its teachings that 'a new-born baby generates the sins of his/her parents in the past'⁴ is certainly incompatible with the orthodox teaching of Islam that 'every human being is born in a pure state without sin'. We also hear about Minangkabau Islam, in which women are put in a strong position in matters of inheritance. One could elaborate further the nuance of un-orthodox Islam as found through Achenese Islam, Sundanese Islam, Maduranese Islam, Buginese Islam, Banjarnese Islam, etc.

The Indonesians who embrace Islam through different processes, according to Clifford Gertz, can be divided into three categories: *santri*, *priyayi* and *abangan*. *Santri* represented a more Salafist Islam, and *priyayi* represented the Muslims whose faith is built upon very deep-seeded Javanese-Hindu culture and mysticism, whereas *abangan* are those whose faith is also tied to pre-Islamic culture and beliefs.⁵ Of course, in the progress, Islam in Indonesia cannot be simplified only with those categories. A young Muslim scholar, Budi Munawar-Rahman, for example,

orthodoxy of Islam. Zoetmulder, P. J., *Pantheism and Monism in Javanese Suluk Literature*, Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995, pp. 17-46.

⁴ Erni Budiwanti, *Islam Sasak Wetu Telu versus Waktu Lima*, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000, p. 184.

⁵ Abuza, Zachary, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, p. 1.

³ According to Zoetmulder, a Dutch Jesuit expert in Javanese literature, the idea of pantheism or monism in Islam can be traced in the thought of al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111), al-Hallāj (d. 922) and Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240). Of course it does not mean that their teaching only shows the notion of pantheism or monism. Many points of their teaching also demonstrate the

categorizes Indonesian Muslims into: 1) the rationalists characterized by an Asha'rite teaching, 2) the neo-modernists oriented to reform (*ijtihad*) on the basis of the morality of the Qur'an in an ethical praxis, and 3) those who struggle for social-economic transformation in the direction to Liberation Theology. Then, Din Syamsuddin categorizes them into: 1) the formalists influenced by the Wahabbism teaching and thus oriented to purification on the basis of Arab Islam, 2) the substantivists emphasizing on the influence of the Islamic values in socio-political aspects, 3) the indigenists understanding Islam as a way of proceeding related to a local culture, and 4) the radicalists or the fundamentalists oriented to purification in all aspects of life.⁶ Al-Chaidar mentions another group of Muslims, called terrorist Muslims.⁷

⁶ Munawar-Rachman, "Dari Tahapan Moral ke Periode Sejarah"; Din Syamsuddin, "Islamic Political Thought and Islamic Cultural Revival in Modern Indonesia" (Paper prepared for the conference on Religion and Society in the Modern World: Islam in Southeast Asia – awaiting publication). In line with Munawar-Rahman and Din Syamsuddin, an Orientalist, Fiederspiel, categorizes Indonesian Muslims into: 1) the *ulama-s* oriented to classical Islam, 2) the revivalists oriented to modern Islam in the nuance of politics, 3) the academicians oriented to sciences in an academic level, and 4) the social activists oriented to praxis. Fiederspiel, "Muslim Intellectuals in Southeast Asia: Tendencies towards Parallel Development" (awaiting publication).

⁷ Al Chaidar, *Pemetaan Kelompok Islam Radikal dan Islam Fundamental di Indonesia*, PDF paper downloaded from <http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=4106D8DE5E4A9462AD3EDBE6E9D5ED2D>. Al-Chaidar says that the orientation of the Indonesian fundamentalist Muslims is related to religious piety. For this, they consider symbols and rituals as very important, and understand 'the texts' in literal manner. Their movement can be characterized as 'a-political', 'idealistic' as well as 'non-managerial'. In addition, in achieving their goal, they will tolerate the use of violence. As for the Indonesian radicalist Muslims, they do not pay attention too much on symbol. On ritual, they hold it only at the level of 'quasi ritual'. For them, the most important thing is political awareness, even though in a certain sense, they work on it in a pragmatic way, in the direction to power. Regarding

Even so, as Mirza Tirta Kusuma reminds us, Indonesian Muslims are not monolithic. She clearly says,

This monolithic categorization promoted by many Western observers has led to a misunderstanding of Islam that could be attributed to their limited knowledge of the religion. While it may be true that a secular bias has contributed to the failure of many non-Muslim scholars to understand Islam, the major pitfall was in their ignorance of Islam as a religion that could be interpreted in many ways. Although Islam may appear to be monolithic, its form and expression vary from one Muslim to another and from group to group.⁸

On Christianity, we have to take note, first of all, that Protestant and Catholic are considered in Indonesia as two different religions. Unfortunately, the non-Christians in general do not always know the difference between Catholic and Protestant.

Concerning the existence of Christianity into Indonesia, it had been said that, since the seventh century, there had been a Christian community in Fansur, or now named Barus, belonging to the Nestorian denomination. Yet, there are neither records nor traces of such a community remains. In fact, the first significant evidence of Christian activities in Indonesia came with the arrival of Portuguese traders in the sixteenth century. Thus, we know from the history, that between 1546 and 1547 Francis Xavier came to Moluccas and introduced Catholicism to the people there. With the coming of the Dutch in the early seventeenth century, through VOC, with the help of the *Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK – the Dutch Reformed Church), Protestant began to spread out.

the approach to achieve the goal, they do not tolerate violence. Then, the Muslims who hold the ideology taken from both the groups of fundamentalist and radicalist are categorized by Al-Chaidar as belonging to 'terrorist Muslims'. For them, ritualism and activism have the same level. In addition to strong political awareness and social concern, they also master technology. In putting together their interest in politics and religion, they do not hesitate to use a violent approach.

⁸ Mirza Tirta Kusuma, "Islam is a Mosaic, Not Monolith", in *The Jakarta Post*, Jakarta, Tuesday, October 12, 2010.

Despite the difficult times under the Dutch, through the tireless work of the missionaries, one of whom was Van Lith, Catholic faith has began to grow in the archipelago since the early 1900-s. According to Jan Aritonang,

Jesuit priest Frans van Lith (1863–1926) not only joined the strategy of the ethical policy by starting the school catholic system in Central Java, but he was also an outspoken admirer of the Javanese society and culture to the point that he considered the Dutch colonialism as a temporary affairs. In his approach to Islam, Van Lith set the standard approach that Javanese culture should be taken very seriously in a positive sense, but that Islam as religion should be neglected.⁹

Although the island of Sumatra is almost entirely Muslim, one still can find some exceptions, because the Batak people of North Sumatra largely embrace Protestant. Christians in the provinces of Java, especially in the capital city, Jakarta, range from 5% up to 12% of the population.

Bali is 92% Hindu with a few Muslim areas in its eastern part. The neighbouring islands of Bali, called West Nusa Tenggara, namely the islands of Lombok and Sumbawa, have substantial Muslim population; it reaches to 96% of the population. As for Christians, they can be found mostly in East Nusa Tenggara islands. Even, in Flores and Sumba as well as West Timor, the number of Christians reaches to over 90% of the population. In the dioceses of this island, the percentage of the Catholic population reaches to more than 95 %.¹⁰

In Borneo, there are substantial Christian populations. The number reaches to 25-35% of the population. They are mostly Dayak people in West, Central and East Borneo provinces. As for in the southern part of Borneo, the seafaring Banjar people are

⁹ Jan Sihar Aritonang, Karel Adriaan Steenbrink, *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, Leiden: Brill, 2008, p. 171.

¹⁰ All the data on the number of the Catholics in the dioceses are taken from the Bishops' Conference of Indonesia.

mostly Muslims. The number of Christians here is very small; it is only about 1-2% of the population.

In North Celebes, 65% of the population is Protestant – most of them are Minahasa people – whereas the number of Catholics reaches to 7%. The island of Moluccas is split between Christian Protestants and Muslims, in such a manner that the ratio of those two communities is 50 % – 50 %. As for the West Papua, it has Christian majorities.

The majority of the Christians, therefore, live in the eastern part of Indonesia. Annual Indonesian population growth is 1.8 %, whereas annual Christian growth reaches to 2.4 %. Concerning Catholic Church, there are 10 archdioceses and 27 dioceses, with 36 bishops. The data from the office of the Bishops' Conference of Indonesia show that the number of the diocesan priests reaches to about 1,220, whereas that of religious priests, about 1,720, that of the religious brothers about 1,030, whereas that of the nuns, about 8,130.

Christian-Muslim Encounter in Indonesia

Up till the independence, Christian-Muslim encounter in Indonesia was coloured with economical and political interest. Thus, in sixteenth to eighteenth century, in the island of Moluccas, for example, the encounter took place due to the fact that Christians and Muslims rivaled each other to control the spices. The respectable work of the missionaries who were sent to Indonesia to take care of the needs of the Spanish, the Portugese as well as the VOC employees in terms of religious affairs, however, was not always accompanied with good attitude. Consequently, Christianity was stigmatized negatively as a religion coming from a colonial product.

In addition, many of the VOC employees had a double standard in dealing with Islam. Jan Pieterszoon Coen, for example, on the one hand, created a bad image on Islam. On the other hand, he did not want Muslims to leave Islam and change to another religion. Even, to create a good image, he would punish with a dead penalty to anyone who committed adultery with Muslims. Conflict

and encounter between Muslims and Christians in the time of the transition from the VOC to the Dutch¹¹ was marked with the change of policies. For example, the religion that did not bring its people to civilization was then held in low esteem. Accordingly, the perception of the Muslims to Christians grew to be more negative. Apart from that, with the progress of the evangelization in Europe, the Dutch introduced some new policies on mission in Indonesia. The prohibition for the missionaries to spread Christianity among the people who had already embraced Islam, as their religion, was one of them.

From the side of Islam, there was a movement oriented to purification, like the Paderi. The movement had developed since 1803, as a result of the contact of the Indonesian Muslims with the Ulama-s from Saudi Arabia, especially the followers of Wahabbism. The Paderi movement sought to maintain Islam in Indonesia from being 'contaminated' or 'infected' with other traditions, including local cultures and customs. The Paderi sought to combat various thoughts and practices that have made Islam in Indonesia not pure. Due to its relation, directly or indirectly, to colonialism, Christianity was then regarded in low esteem.

The banner of Islam was sometimes risen up to give new spirit in fighting against the Dutch, like what took place in the war of Diponogero (1825-1830) or the war of Aceh (1873-1907). The fight against the Dutch was considered as almost identical with the struggle against Christianity. As such, the Dutch colonial policy tried to prevent Islam from becoming a focus of nationalism by co-opting the Javanese nobles known as *priyayi* and turning them into colonial administrators.¹² One should take note, however, that the struggle against Dutch colonialism was supported not only by Muslim groups but also by Christian movements, such as *Perserikatan Kaum Kristen* (Christians League) and *Partai Kaum Masehi Indonesia* (Party of Indonesian Christians). For this, due to the struggle for independence, Indonesian Christians and Muslims

could work together. This also took place during the Japanese occupation. In sum, the collaboration between Indonesian Muslims and Christians came to pass in a concrete way when the leaders from those two communities of believer, along with the Indonesia's founding fathers, worked together to shape the nation.

One should remember that the Indonesia's founding fathers chose Pancasila as a basis for the Constitution. As such, Pancasila consists of five core principles, namely: Belief in the one supreme God, Just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, Democracy guided by the inner wisdom, and Social justice for the whole people of Indonesia. The first principle recognizes the role of religion in public life, but it does not mean that the state recognizes a certain religion – even Islam, as the religion of the majority of the Indonesians – to be the state religion. The freedom of every citizen to practice his or her faith is ensured in the Indonesian constitution. Indeed, the article 29 of the constitution says: 'The state guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her religion or belief'. Belief in the one supreme God is therefore widely accepted, although we have to acknowledge that, as in any society, there are certain groups which are inclined to reject common wisdom.

Sukarno believed that multi-confessional Indonesia could never be a 'unitary' state with Islam as its basis.¹³ This corresponds to what Hadikusumo emphasized, that 'Indonesia is founded not on the basis of a certain religion'.¹⁴ In line with this, Soepomo explicitly said in his speech in May 31, 1945, "[I]n this unitary state, religious affairs are separated from political affairs; and thus, in this unitary state, religious affairs will be handled by a community of believers to which the matters are relating. In such kind of state, anyone has freedom to live his or her own religion.... The group of majority and the group of minority will be surely delighted to live in such kind of state."¹⁵ The decree of 1978 (TAP

¹¹ Aritonang, Jan, *Sejarah Perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia*, pp. 73-77.

¹² Abuza, Zachary, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, p. 14.

¹³ Abuza, Zachary, *Ibid*, p. 16.

¹⁴ Moh. Yamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-undang Dasar 1945*, Vol. I, p. 386.

¹⁵ Moh. Yamin, *Ibid*, p. 117.

No. 2/MPR/1978 II) stressed the same idea, that 'all of us (i.e. Indonesians) are aware that religion and belief in One God is the matter that has to do with a personal relationship with God in whom he or she believes'.¹⁶

In the late 1940s and 1950s, after the Republic of Indonesia declared independence from the Dutch, the idea of Islamic statehood spread rapidly throughout the archipelago. Sukarno wanted to establish a secular state and importantly assuage the ethnic minority groups that dominated the outer islands of the archipelago. To that end, he controversially removed the draft preamble to the 1945 constitution – a statement that, while not turning Indonesia into an Islamic state, declares that there is a legal "obligation to follow Islamic *sharia* for its adherents." This became known as 'the Jakarta Charter' and was omitted by Sukarno from the final draft of the Constitution.¹⁷ In fact, some Muslims could not accept it, and the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter has always been a central political goal of many Muslims. We thus remember about the movement of *Darul Islam* (Realm of Islam) started in 1947 by Kartosuwiryo and was later on followed by Kahar Muzakar in South Celebes. Three forces were thus involved in fighting for supremacy in Indonesia in those periods, namely *Darul Islam* secessionists, Sukarno's nationalist forces, and the Dutch. In facing those challenges, some Christian and Muslim leaders worked together to keep Indonesia as the common house for all people living in archipelago. Kasimo and Natsir are two among many important figures who made a great effort on it. The idea to refuse the establishment of *sharia* as the foundation of the legal system is largely combined with the idea to support Pancasila as a common platform for governing public life in a context that is multi-ethnic and multi-religious as well as multi-cultural, like Indonesia. On this point, a well-known dictum was expressed by Mgr. Soegiyopranoto, S. J, in inviting the Indonesian Catholics to

¹⁶ This idea was realized in a national program called P4 (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*: the guidance to live and put Pancasila in practice).

¹⁷ Abuza, Zachary, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, p. 15.

be 'one hundred percents Catholic and one hundred percents Indonesian'.

During the New Order period, Soeharto tried to use all means available, including religions, to keep him and his cronies in power. In the beginning, let us say around 1966-1973, Christians felt that they gained more benefit from the policies of the government. This was supported by the fact that many ex-members of the Communist Party or the political prisoners preferred to embrace Christianity than other religions. The existence of the Chinese-Christian group called 'the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)', born in 1971, as the think tank of the New Order regime, has given impression that the Muslims were somehow discounted. Muslims and Christians were in fact involved in a dispute on some problems related to religious education, mixed marriage and the building of the houses of worship. For this, the government tried to promote interreligious dialogue. This was begun in 1967 with Soeharto's program called *Musyawaharah Antar Agama (Interreligious Dialogue)*.¹⁸ In some cases, however, interreligious dialogue was promoted just as a means to support the agenda of the regime. It was carried out under government cooptation to find consensus for the sake of national stability. Then the Bishops' Conference of Indonesia tried to respond the situation at those periods by holding a meeting, called MUKSI, as a way to give guidance for the Catholic Church in Indonesia that her main mission is to struggle for the benefit of all people in the nation.

In the middle of the New Order period, the situations seemed to be the opposite. The pendulum appeared more on the side of Islam. It took place due to the fact that, in the mid 1980s, the economy was slowing and the system was increasingly mired in corruption. Soeharto turned to Islam as a means to help legitimize his regime. Thus, he increased public displays of religiosity, began speaking Arabic, went on the *hajj* (the pilgrimage

¹⁸ See, the speech delivered by Soeharto on November 30, 1967, in Hasyim, Umar, *Toleransidan Kemerdekaan Beragama dalam Islam*, Surabaya, Bina Ilmu, 1991, p. 393.

to Mecca) and promoted the so-called 'green'¹⁹ generals to leadership positions in the military. Between 1988 and 1993, Soeharto even tried to ally with the Islamist hard-liners to counter the growing calls for democratization from a large portion of the population. In fact, in approaching the end of the New Order period, from 1994 to 1996, there were a number of violent confrontations between indigenous peoples of East Timor, Flores, and Borneo – whose majority were predominantly Christian – against Muslim migrants. In addition, at the end of the New Order regime, several bombs exploded in the houses of worship. Moreover, the tragedy of Ambon (in Moluccas) and Poso (Central Celebes) broke out. By this, Christian-Muslim encounter in Indonesia seemed to be more complicated. On the one hand, Muslims and Christians murdered one another in Moluccas, but on the other hand, many people also made efforts by collecting humanitarian aid for both sides.

Since 11 September 2001, Indonesia has been the victim of some major terrorist attacks that have killed many people, like in Bali (2002 and 2005) and around Jakarta (2003 and 2004). One of the more disturbing aspects of the sectarian violence that engulfed Moluccas and Central Celebes after the fall of Soeharto is the emergence of a number of armed and seemingly well-trained *mujahidin* groups, one of which was *Laskar Jihad*.²⁰ The militant groups are all committed to implementing a more extensive version

¹⁹ The term 'green' would mean 'Islamic oriented'. The color 'green' is used as the opposite of 'red' pointing to secular nationalist. Abuza, Zachary, *Ibid*, p. 19.

²⁰ Concerning *Laskar Jihad* (Jihad Paramilitary Forces), Jafar Umar as its founder said, "We founded this movement in order to support Muslims in eastern Indonesia. They were slaughtered by the thousands in Moluccas. The government did nothing to defend the Muslims. Subsequent governments did not defend them from Christian attacks." Jafar was approached in January 2000 by Islamist sympathizers in the military with the message that they approved of his plans to escalate the armed campaign against the Christians in Moluccas. Indeed, when he disbanded the group in October 2002, Jafar asserted 'there was no pressure on us from military to stop'!

of *sharia* through public policy, issue by issue. We have to acknowledge that there have been *sharia* components in many key pieces of public policy legislation, including the Marriage Law, Penal Code, Education Law, and Anti-Pornography Law. In fact, the *sharia* regional regulations have increased during the period 1999-2009, and they have now reached to 151 regional regulations.²¹

As such, a survey conducted by a national daily news, *Kompas*, for 1540 holders of the telephone in some big cities in Indonesia shows that 40,1 % of the respondents worried about the destruction of the nation due to the conflict among religions, whereas 27 % worried about the conflict among the groups of ethnicity, 8,8 % about the conflict among the supporters of the politic parties, 7,7 % about the conflict between the poor and the rich, and 5,9 % about the conflict between regions.²²

Indonesia has to face the danger of the destruction taking place in other areas of life as well. Regarding deforestation, for example, it reaches to 2 million hectares per year. Indonesia also suffered because of illegal lodging. It is not without reason that Theys Hiyo Eluay, the head of the presidium of Papua, was found dead on November 11, 2001. In the area of health, the data shows that 2,100, 000 wives and 3,700,000 babies are potentially affected

²¹ In general, these *sharia* are designed to govern three aspects of public life, namely (1) to eradicate social crimes especially prostitutions and gambling; (2) to enforce ritual observances among Muslims such as reading the Qur'an, Friday congregations and fasting during Ramadhan; and (3) to govern the way people dress up in public sphere—especially the head-veiling for women. These laws are controversial. Cf. Dewi Candraningrum's working-paper "Perda Sharia and the Indonesian Women's Critical Perspectives", presented at the conference on "NeueWillkuergegen Frauen in Indonesien: Kontroversen um die Umsetzung der Regionale Scharia-Gesetze Perda Syariah (New Arbitrary against Women inIndonesia: Perda Sharia and Women's Rights)", Saturday 11 November 2006, held by SOAI (Suedostasien Informationsstelle, Asienhaus) and MATA Asien in Blick, at ÜBERSEE MUSEUM Bremen, Germany.

²² *Kompas*, August 16, 1999.

by HIV/AIDS.²³ Moreover, poverty is always part of the problem in Indonesia. There were almost 36,000,000 Indonesians, and this means 18 % of the population, do not get enough food.²⁴ Concerning education, the data shows that the number on the primary school students who have to drop out, every year, reaches to 18,600,000, while the number of the jobless people, to 42,000,000.²⁵

In facing those problems, inter-religious cooperation is no longer an option but a necessity! It was, in fact, the result of the symposium organized by the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue, on Jan. 16-18, 2003. This surely corresponds to the expectation of the Pope John Paul II, as it was expressed in his exhortation to the members of the post-Synod Council of the General Secretariat of the Synod of Bishops for the Special Assembly for Asia, "Catholics in Asia are a 'small flock'.... [In a] context that is multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural, one in which Christianity is often perceived as foreign, dialogue is typical of the life of the Church in Asia."²⁶ In this matter, one is aware that interreligious dialogue is not simply understood as a strategy to prevent the disintegration of the nation, or a reactive effort to deal with people of other religions in a given context, but primarily as an opportunity to manifest faith in daily life.²⁷ In sum,

²³ *SuaraPembangunan*, September 6, 2002.

²⁴ *Kompas*, November 13, 2002.

²⁵ *SuaraPembangunan*, September 12, 2002.

²⁶ <http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=1942>

²⁷ One could call to mind James Fowler's theory on the stages of faith development. Cf. Fowler, James, *Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning*, San Fransisco, Harper & Row, 1981. In light of Fowler's theory, one could say that interreligious dialogue, in which respect and openness to other believers are imperative, is necessary, because it is part one's faith development. By referring to universal values, one is called to mature one's faith to the point that concern is not simply limited to those who share the same religion as oneself. With this understanding, one would engage in interreligious dialogue with full of awareness of the meaning of

dialogue is an indispensable step along the path towards human self-realization ... both of each individual and of every human community.²⁸

In fact, a paradigm shift on interreligious dialogue has also taken place in Indonesia, especially with a movement sponsored by *Paramadina* Foundation, and the attempts made by INTERFIDEI (Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesia) or MADIA (*Masyarakat Dialog antar Agama*: Society for Interreligious Dialogue). These groups have made efforts to promote interreligious dialogue as social critique in a way that can fight against poverty, injustice and fundamentalism.

The Role of the Indonesian Catholic Church

In the national level, the support of the Catholic Church in promoting interreligious dialogue as social critique can be seen clearly from the voice of the Bishops' Conference of Indonesia. Through the annual pastoral letters, the members of the Catholic Church are called for solidarity with all people of the nation. We can find them, for examples, in the letter of the year 1997 and 1999, as well as the letter of Easter 1999.²⁹

encounter, rather than simply demonstrating tolerance to meet an external demand.

²⁸ John Paul II, *Ut Unum Sint*, (28).

²⁹ Part of the pastoral letter of the year 1997 says, "Minority and majority have the same opportunity to do common good. Wherever we, as Catholics, are the majority, let the people of other religions feel secured and fully accepted by us. And, wherever we are a minority, let us remain open; even, to take initiative in building collaboration with the people and the prominent figures of other religions." As for part of the pastoral letter of Easter 1999, it says "We need to re-study our own religious teachings and practice our faith as a way for us to love God and our brothers and sisters! Religion is, thus, neither outward appearances nor ritual ceremonies.... We cannot live our religion as a tool to make separation and an instrument to create sentiments that can bring people into division. We are also proud that we found among many believers awareness and

worship to disseminating or broadcasting precepts of any religion.³¹

At the level of diocese, many efforts have been made to show that the Catholic Church seriously takes responsibility in building interreligious dialogue. From the diocese of Amboina, for example, it is reported that they keep setting up training on non-violence movement for the youths. In doing so, they work together with the groups coming from various religious backgrounds. They are also working out, together with all the elements of the society, to make socialization on the problems related to HIV/AIDS and women trafficking for the youths from any part of Moluccas.

Concluding Remarks

When I accompanied a group of Jesuit scholastics in doing an immersion program for two weeks in a *pesantren*, in Salatiga, I noticed somehow three dynamic progressions there. The first progression took place for about one week, namely when the scholastics and *santri*-s made conversation in a formal manner. The language used for most of the times was still Indonesian, and the topics of conversation were still very general, for examples on their family, their hobbies, etc. The second progression took place for about three days, namely when they began communicating many things more profoundly, for examples about philosophy or the condition of Indonesia, by using the Javanese language, although it was still in the highest degree (*kromoinggil*). The third progression took place in the last four days, namely when the scholastics and *santri*-s began touching the problems related to their faith – for examples on: who Jesus is, what religious life means, why non-violence is important –by using the Javanese language in the lowest degree (*ngoko*). In addition, surprisingly, in one of the last days, they propose themselves to go with us visiting the area of a Jesuit house in Girisonta – about twenty minutes from

Salatiga – and even participate in a Sunday mass in the parish church of that town.

The dynamism of interreligious relation in Indonesia reveals a certain process. By referring to the experience of the immersion program, as I illustrated in the earlier paragraph, the encounter we have built so far, perhaps, has not yet reached to a certain degree of the intensity like what we found ‘in the last four days’. Nevertheless, we will never lose my hope on it. In the past, Christians and Muslims could work together to reach precious ideals, namely national independence. In the present and the future, for sure, we can also collaborate mutually, as our way of proceeding and manifestation of faith, to respond our momentous challenges, that is to say the stumbling blocks of the nation. *In sya’ Allah!*

³¹ <http://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-drafts-religion-legislation-to-protect-all-faiths/2516595.html>